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Air/Ground Wind Shear Information Integration
Flight Test Results
David A. Hinton
ABSTRACT
An element of the NASA/FAA wind shear program is the
integration of ground-based microburst information on the
flight deck, to support airborne wind shear alerting and
microburst avoidance. NASA conducted a wind shear flight
test program in the summer of 1991 during which airborne
processing of Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) data was
used to derive microburst alerts. High level microburst
products were extracted from TDWR, transmitted to a NASA
Boeing 737 in flight via data link, and processed to estimate
the wind shear hazard level (F-factor) that would be
experienced by the aircraft in the core of each microburst.
The microburst location and F-factor were used to derive a
situation display and alerts. The situation display was
successfully used to maneuver the aircraft for microburst
penetrations, during which in situ "truth" measurements were
made. A total of 19 penetrations were made of TDWR-reported
microburst locations, resulting in 18 airborne microburst
alerts from the TDWR data and two microburst alerts from the
airborne in situ measurements. The primary factors affecting
alerting performance were spatial offset of the flight path
from the region of strongest shear, differences in TDWR
measurement altitude and airplane penetration altitude, and
variations in microburst outflow profiles. Predicted and
measured F-factors agreed well in penetrations near
microburst cores. Although improvements in airborne and
ground processing of the TDWR measurements would be required
to support an airborne executive-level alerting protocol, the
feasibility of airborne utilization of TDWR data link data
has been demonstrated.
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Research Goal
Under the terms of the Integrated Wind Shear Program, NASA,
the FAA and industry have jointly developed solutions to the
wind shear hazard to commercial transports. The NASA efforts
are concentrated in airborne aspects such as hazard
characterization, aircraft performance impact, advanced
in sltu and forward-look sensor technology, and flight deck
integration. The FAA efforts have been concentrated in
ground side aspects such as crew training (ref. I) and
ground-based detection systems such as low-level wind shear
alerting systems and Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR).
The TDWR system has proven its capability to detect the
microburst phenomenology in tests and operational
demonstrations, but experiences suggest (ref. 2) that the
information is not reaching flight crews in a timely matter
or in a form that is compatible with existing and planned
onboard wind shear detection systems.
In 1990 a Memorandum of Agreement between NASA and the FAA
was implemented with a major program element to "Demonstrate
the practicality and utility of real-time assimilation and
synthesis of ground-derived wind shear data to support
executive level cockpit warning and crew-centered information
display." The goal can be divided into subgoals of
identifying ground-based information products required on the
flight deck to derive a crew-centered hazard index and
rapidly transmitting this data to the flight deck.
84
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Ground Rules
Ground rules were established for the conduct of this
program. The key ground rule was that neither the existing
TDWR system nor the current division of responsibilities and
roles between air traffic control and pilots would be
altered. The TDWR system was to remain unchanged because
years of testing have demonstrated its microburst detection
capability, the system design was essentially frozen for
production, and even minor changes would be prohibitively
expensive. Rather than change the system, those high level
products produced by TDWR that are required for airborne
processing were to be identified and provided to an aircraft
via data link. The emphasis was to provide an executive
level warning (requiring immediate corrective or compensatory
action by the crew). Such a warning requires a very low
nuisance alarm rate, on the order of 1 nuisance per 250 hours
of system operation. A nuisance is defined as an alert
received when system alert threshold conditions exist but do
not produce a hazard to the aircraft.
The air/ground roles of the proposed system are tailored to
reflect current ATC/pilot roles. The TDWR is to classify
events as a microburst and provide location and microburst
parameters to the airborne system. The airborne component
will quantify the threat, compare to a threshold, and
annunciate. The concept is analogous to other ground systems
providing meteorological data such as runway visual range,
wind, and ceiling. The decision to continue is made on the
aircraft based on required minima and operating procedures.
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System Architecture
The baseline TDWR system consists of a radar, a ground
processor to identify regions of divergence and classify them
as microbursts, a geographic situation display to depict
microburst locations relative to runways and approach paths
to the ATC tower supervisor, and an alphanumeric ribbon
display for presenting wind shear and microburst information
to the local controller for voice transmission to pilots. A
typical message from the local controller is "Microburst
alert, threshold wind 140 at 5, expect a 50 knot loss two
mile final." The additions to the TDWR system required to
support the NASA alerting concept are a cockpit server
software package to extract the necessary TDWR data for
transmission over a data link, the data link
recelver/transmitter, airborne algorithms to compute the wind
shear hazard from TDWR supplied data, and annunciation and
display. Only air to ground data link is required to provide
airborne alerting. The intent of the down link is to provide
the ATC system with information that a wind shear alert has
been generated by the airborne system. No changes to the
existing TDWR system are required to support this concept.
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Operational Concept
The current TDWR operational concept is to detect microbursts
by examining radar-observed wind velocity information for
regions of divergence. When the radar detects a divergence
of greater than 15 meters per second over a distance of at
least 1 kilometer, a shape algorithm draws a microburst icon
around the divergence region. "Wind shear" icons are drawn
around divergence regions of at least 7.5 meters per second.
The microburst is then quantified for ATC and pilots by the
divergence value. The actual hazard to the aircraft depends
heavily, though, on the scale length of the divergence, i.e.,
the change of wind per unit distance, or shear (ref. 3).
Existing airborne wind shear systems as well as those under
development derive an F-factor hazard index (ref. 3) that is
based on wind change per unit distance and down draft. To
provide airborne executive level alerting from TDWR
information, an estimate must be made of the wind shear in
the microburst and the down draft component. The information
required for this estimate are readily available from the
TDWR system. Since (at a readily available level) the TDWR
produces a single velocity and distance number for each
microburst, insufficient data are available to estimate the
shear along arbitrary paths through the event. The airborne
F-factor estimate tested in this study describes the threat
only in the core of the event. The core F-factor estimate is
then combined on the aircraft with microburst location
information to determine if an alert should be given.
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Least-Square Estimate of Linear Shear
The wind shear within a microburst can be estimated from the
wind change and scale length information provided by the TDWR
and an assumed wind profile. The TDWR information describes
the endpoints of the peak-to-peak winds and the assumed wind
profile is used to derive information about the wind field
between the peaks. The horizontal wind profile of the
analytical Oseguera/Bowles microburst model described in
reference 4 was used to estimate the least-squares shear
value over a distance D about the core of the microburst.
Since aircraft performance degradation from wind shear
req_/ires shear lengths on the order of 1 kilometer, or
greater, a value of 1 kilometer for D was used in the
experiment.
The microburst F-factor can be estimated from the shear value
Just determined and an estimate of the down draft in the
event. Mass continuity considerations are used to estimate
down draft over the same interval as the shear. The
resulting equations, as originally derived by Bowles (ref. 3)
are shown on the adjacent figure. The information required
from the TDWR to estimate F-factor is the wind change (AU),
the scale length of the wind change (_R) and the altitude of
the radar beam in the microburst core.
Each microburst icon is composed of numerous divergence
segments, each one degree apart in radar azimuth. Each
divergence segment has its own wind change and length. In
this experiment the AU and AR sent to the aircraft was
determined as follows. If 5 or fewer segments define an icon
then send the maximum AU value. If this test fails then if
20 or fewer segments define an icon send the second largest
aU value. If more than 20 segments define an icon then send
the 90th percentile segment AU value. In practice, nearly
all icons consisted of less than 20 segments and either the
largest or next largest divergence value was normally sent.
The AR value was determined by examining the shear value of
each segment in the icon and choosing the 85th percentile
shear value. A _R value was then determined that would
produce this 85th percentile shear when divided into the
transmitted AU value. As an example, one icon penetrated in
the 1991 flight tests (event 143) was defined by 4 segments
having AU values of 17.1, 18.9, 22.6, and 20.2 meters/second
and AR values of 3140, 3460, 4500, and 4210 meters,
respectively. The corresponding shear values were 5.45,
5.46, 5.02, and 4.80 meters/second/kilometer. Since four
segments defined the icon the largest _U value (22.6) was
transmitted. The 85th percentile shear value was the second
largest (5.45) which produced a transmitted AR value of 4150
meters (rounded to the nearest i0 meters).

Alert Criteria
The TDWRdata link provided the required data to estimate the
microburst core F-factor and to depict the TDWR-derived
microburst icons on a cockpit moving map display. In order
to issue an executive-level alert, a microburst icon must
exist on the projected instantaneous trajectory of the
aircraft (defined by the centerline of the track-up moving
map display), the range to the icon must be less than 1.5
nautical miles, and the core F-factor estimate must be at
least 0.105. Note that in a classical microburst wind field
the strongest wind gradient and F-factor exists in the core
of the event, where the winds are weakest, while very weak
wind gradients and F-factors exist in the vicinity of peak
wind outflow. Since the TDWR-produced microburst shapes tend
to enclose the peak-to-peak wind field, it is logical to
assume that the shapes will overestimate the region of strong
shear. Since insufficient data was available to determine
which region within the icon contained the strongest shear,
an alert was generated when any part of an icon intersected
the flight path. The alert threshold is consistent with
thresholds specified in FAA TSO-CII7 for the certification of
reactive wind shear devices and the 1.5 mile range is
consistent with proposed crew procedures and the supporting
alerting strategies.
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Flight Test Procedure
The TDWR data link concept was tested during NASA combined
sensor flight tests conducted at Orlando, Florida and Denver,
Colorado in June and July of 1991. The tests provided the
opportunity to measure microburst winds with an array of
remote sensors (TDWR, airborne radar, and infrared) and
correlate those remote measurements with aircraft in situ
wind shear measurements taken during microburst penetration.
In addition to the TDWR research aspect, the TDWR system was
also used operationally to predict microbursts, maneuver the
aircraft for penetrations, and monitor flight safety criteria
such as storm reflectivity values. Both for flight safety
and for later data correlation, microburst penetrations were
conducted on a track either toward or away from the TDWR to
minimize the effects of any microburst asymmetry.
The flight tests were conducted in cooperation with the MIT
Lincoln Laboratory at Orlando and the National Center for
Atmospheric Research (NCAR) at Denver. Both Lincoln Lab and
NCAR developed cockpit server software to extract the
required parameters from the TDWR and format the data for
transmission to a NASA ground station via modem and dedicated
phone lines. Only low cost hardware was required to complete
the data link to the aircraft. The data was transmitted at
1200 baud over an MFJ Enterprises MFJ-1270B TNC packet radio
system. The data transmitted over the data link consisted of
the AU, aR, radar beam altitude, and coordinates of each
microburst icon, as well as overhead data such as the GMT
time of the beginning of the TDWR radar scan, number of icons
in the data link message, and checksum. Each data link
message required 14 bytes for overhead data plus 25 bytes per
microburst icon. This data was transmitted approximately
once every 60 seconds and the elapsed time between the
beginning of a TDWR radar antennae sweep and the receipt of
that data onboard the aircraft was on the order of 30
seconds. Onboard the aircraft the icons were displayed on a
moving map display and used to maneuver the aircraft for
microburst penetrations.

Moving Map Display
The TDWR icon information was presented on a moving map
display, along with supporting flight state parameters, and
recorded on video tape for later analysis. The supporting
data included the TDWRdata age (elapsed time since last data
llnk reception) and in situ F-factor in the upper right
corner; true airspeed, time, radar altitude and inertial wind
vector in the upper left corner; groundspeed and barometric
altitude below the ownship symbol; and magnetic track angle
above the track scale. Microburst alerts generated by the
onboard computation and criteria were displayed by the
message "TDWR ALERT" in red letters just below the track
scale. The wind change and F-factor of each icon were shown
numerically by labels that stepped from one icon to the next
at the rate of about one icon per second (to reduce display
clutter) and by color coding the icons. White was used to
draw icons with F less than 0.105, amber for icons between
0.105 and 0.15 F, and red for icons with F-factors at or
above 0.15. Also shown on the display were the limits of
TDWRcoverage and a waypoint which could be transmitted from
the TDWR operator to accurately locate places of interest
such as gust front boundaries, microburst cores, or predicted
mlcroburst locations. This display is not intended to
represent a format that should be implemented for fleet
operational use. The display was intended as an aid to data
analysis as well as a tool for situational awareness during
research flights.
The accompanying display sketch was drawn from a video tape
of the approach to event 143 on June 20, 1991. Four
microburst icons are ahead of the airplane and a waypoint
transmitted by the TDWR operator is on the flight path at a
range of about 1.5 miles. The aircraft has a groundspeed of
237 knots and the radar altimeter value is 1061 feet. A TDWR
alert has been generated by onboard logic and is displayed.
The dotted line just beyond the nearest icon represents a 30
kilometer range ring from the TDWR site, which is behind the
aircraft.
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Results
The simple data link hardware proved very reliable at both
deployment locations both while on the ground preparing for
takeoff as well as while flying at low altitude 30 to 40
kilometers from the antennae site. The situation display
combined with voice information from the TDWR proved
invaluable for 15 to 30 minute projections of the weather
situation, positioning the aircraft to intercept microbursts
that were being predicted but not yet developed, maneuvering
with respect to active microbursts, and subsequent data
analysis. The situation display was used for maneuvering the
airplane to penetrate active microbursts and for assessing
the strength of those microbursts before penetration. The
voice link was used for other operational data such as
reflectlvity at the surface and aloft, short term microburst
predictions, and general weather trends.
During the two week deployment at Orlando the NASA aircraft
penetrated 19 weather events that were generating TDWR icons
at the time of penetration. Numerous other events were also
encountered such as gust fronts, rain shafts, and divergent
flows that had not yet strengthened to the point of
generating an icon or decaying microbursts that were no
longer producing icons. These other events are not included
in this analysis. During a three week deployment at Denver
the only observed microbursts were above flight safety
reflectivity limits or could not be reached. Hence all data
presented here is from the 19 icon penetrations in the
Orlando area.
The data is analyzed from two perspectives. The first issue
was the performance of the F-factor estimation algorithm.
The second issue was the overall alerting performance of the
TDWR system (TDWR, airborne processing, and alerting
criteria) during the flight tests.
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F-Factor Algorithm Performance
While the overall alerting performance analysis uses data
from all 19 icon penetrations, evaluation of the F-factor
estimation algorithm can be done only in those cases where
the airplane passed through the region described by the
estimator, which is in or very near the core of the
microburst. Early in the flight tests it became apparent
that the TDWR depicts microbursts with multiple icons,
typically three or four, to locate areas of larger and
smaller divergence (aU magnitude). All icons associated with
a microburst were treated equally by the airborne F-factor
estimator although not all icons contained a center of
divergence. Observation by TDWR operators, who could observe
flight path as well as radar reflectivity and doppler
velocity in real time, indicated that penetration of an icon
could miss the divergence core by a kilometer or more. Later
flights used the TDWR operator waypoint data link function to
help locate the desired cores of the microbursts.
To evaluate the F-factor algorithm a selection criteria was
established to determine which penetration data sets were
applicable. The selection was based on TDWR radar velocity
plots overlaid with aircraft trajectory. To include a
penetration in the F-factor data set two criteria must be
met; i) that the TDWR velocity plot show a well-defined
microburst outflow, and 2) that the flight path intersect the
core of this outflow. Only five of the 19 events satisfied
this criteria. Three of the five events were achieved during
multiple penetrations of a single microburst on the final day
of test flights, at growing, near peak, and decaying periods
of the event. Event numbers were assigned to each data block
of interest during the deployments. The five core
penetrations are events 81, 134, 142, 143, and 144.
For comparisons between the F-factor estimator and in situ
measurements, the TDWR radar scan taken closest to the time
of airplane penetration was chosen. The average error
between the TDWR F-factor estimator and in situ was only 0.02
F with the largest error beinq 0.04 F. The primary factors
affecting the estimation, to be discussed in more detail,
were differences between TDWR radar measurement altitude and
airplane altitude in the microburst, and errors in estimating
the one kilometer shear from TDWR peak-to-peak winds.
All TDWR radar reflectivity, velocity, and shear maps were
provided to NASA by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory.
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TDWR Plot of Missed Microburst Core and Microburst Core
Penetration
These two plots show examples of a microburst icon
penetration that did not encounter the core region described
by the F-factor estimation algorithm and a penetration
through a microburst core. The first event is not included
in the set of five core penetrations. The second plot shows
the airplane in the core of the penetration cataloged as
event 142. Note in the second plot that the flight path
passes through the doublet of highest doppler velocity
return.
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Speed and Altitude Effect on F-Factor
As the altitude of microburst penetration increases above the
altitude of maximum outflow, the horizontal wind change
decreases while the down draft increases. Since the F-factor
experienced by the airplane is proportional to horizontal
wind gradient multiplied by groundspeed and down draft
divided by airspeed, the horizontal component of F-factor
tends to decrease with increasing altitude while the vertical
component tends to increase with altitude. At normal
approach speeds the change in the two components tend to be
of similar magnitude. The result is that the F-factor does
not vary greatly with altitude above the altitude of maximum
outflow up to altitudes where microbursts no longer pose a
safety threat (about i000 to 1500 feet). Below the altitude
of maximum microburst outflow both horizontal winds and
vertical winds decrease, leading to reduced F-factor. At the
high speeds used in the microburst flights, however, the down
draft contributes less to the total F-factor and the measured
F-factor does tend to decrease with altitude. The plot shows
variation in the altitude-corrected TDWR F-factor estimation
with altitude at a groundspeed of 70 and 115 meters per
second (136 knots and 223 knots) for a given microburst. The
two speeds approximate normal approach speed and the NASA
microburst penetration speed. The plot assumes that the
altitude of maximum outflow is 90 meters and that the radar
measurement is taken at that altitude. At 70 meters/second
the change in F-factor from 90 meters to 350 meters is less
than 0.01, while at 115 meters/second the change is nearly
0.04. The equation used to provide the TDWR altitude
correction is presented next.
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F-Factor Altitude Effect
The trend of relatively constant F-factor with variations in
altitude was used as an assumption in the TDWR F-factor
estimation algorithm. Although aircraft speed was used in
the F-factor algorithm, the altitude of the aircraft was not
included in any way. The divergence measured by the radar
was used directly and the altitude of the radar beam in the
microburst was used in the estimation of the vertical wind.
In effect, the F-factor estimate was assuming a penetration
at the radar beam altitude. In the events penetrated the
radar beam was typically at altitudes of 150 to 220 meters
above ground, depending on range of the event from the radar,
while the airplane typically flew through the event at 300 to
350 meters above ground. The analytical microburst models
described in references 4 and 5 include a shaping function
which describes the change in microburst outflow with
altitude. These models base the shaping function on mass
continuity, boundary layer friction, and vertical wind
profiles produced by the Terminal Area Simulation System
(TASS) numerical microburst model, which has been extensively
validated against observed microburst data (references 6 and
7). The shaping function p(h) provides the ratio of outflow
speed to maximum outflow speed at any arbitrary altitude.
Given this shaping function, the shear estimate (@) at any
altitude can be expressed as the shear at the altitude of
maximum outflow multiplied by p(h).
= J_' p(h) (i)
Where _' is the shear at the altitude of maximum outflow.
can express F at any altitude as:
We
and
F 1 = li'P(hl) (V/g + 2hl/V )
F 2 = i%'P(h2) (V/g + 2h2/V)
(2)
(3)
or by rearranging 2 and 3:
F 2 = F 1 P(h2) (V/g + 2h2/V ) (4)
P(hl) (V/g + 2hl/V )
Equation 4 was used as an altitude correction algorithm where
F 1 is the uncorrected TDWR F-factor estimation, h I is the
TDWR radar beam altitude, and h 2 is the airplane altitude.
F 2 then becomes the F-factor estimate at the airplane
altitude.
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TDWR Based F-Factor and In Situ F-Factor
Shown in this plot is the F-factor estimated from TDWR data
for each of the five core penetrations compared to the
maximum in situ F-factor experienced during that event. Both
the uncorrected TDWR F-factor and the altitude-corrected
F-factor are shown. Also depicted are the alert thresholds
of each sensor (0.105) and the ideal "line of agreement".
The in situ and TDWR F-factors can be directly compared in
this manner since both are tuned to a scale length that
affects airplane performance. In the case of the in situ
measurement this scale length sensitivity is achieved through
gust-rejection filtering. With the exception of the
rightmost point (event 143) the TDWR F-factor overestimates
the in situ F-factor. When the altitude correction is
applied though, the lower four events agree well.
Considering that the two measurements are taken by different
sensors on different platforms, and at slightly different
times, the agreement is excellent. Of course much more data
is needed to begin to assign statistical significance to this
data. The reason for the relatively large TDWR underestimate
of the F-factor for event 143 is related to shear estimation
from TDWR products and will be discussed next.
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Shear Estimation from TDWR Data
Event 143 showed a substantial F-factor underestimate from
the airborne algorithms when subjected to the altitude
correction formula. The issue that arises is whether the
altitude correction formula was incorrect in this case or
whether another factor is involved. Examination of the
moving map display video tape showed that the peak in situ
F-factor was reached in the first third of the distance
through the icon, as opposed to the center of the icon as
would be expected. A plot of the along-track component of
inertial winds as recorded on the aircraft during the
penetration shows that the wind profile did not match the
assumed profile between the peak winds. In particular, an
intermediate peak in the wind was experienced about halfway
through the event. This peak was nearly as large in
magnitude as the peak outflow on the far side of the
microburst.
The ground rules associated with this experiment prohibited
changes to the ground system and led to shear estimation from
information about the peak wind points. This requires an
assumption about the wind profile between the peaks which, as
is demonstrated here, will not always be true. In
particular, pulsing microbursts may generate a microburst
within a macroburst. The shear between the peak-to-peak
winds may be low, but a smaller region of intense shear may
exist within the outflow. This pulsing phenomena is observed
both in field measurements and in TASS numerical simulation
microbursts and may be very common (references 2 and 8).
The TDWR system is capable of directly locating regions of
strong shear, as demonstrated by shear plots produced by MIT
Lincoln Laboratory for post-flight data analysis, but the
current alerting strategy does not require nor utilize this
capability. Properly implemented, shear-based alerting could
enhance the location of hazardous shears and improve the
quantification of the hazard to aircraft.
94
O
s_
O
II Immm
IIm
ILl
s_
E
G)
t_
>,
"O
c_
:D
O
!--
G)
.(Z
c_E
e- o ._
c s. _)
-o (/) o
o o '_
> _ O
m O ._
O "" Z3
_ O
...eE .a
r- o
m
(/)
E
iiim
•1_ G) O
(/) ,_ ---
L_ O _'"
:D c- X
.(3 G)
O >'"-
,_ _ n_
.o_ E E
O
"O.Q
.c c- O
,m s-
OU _ o
mm
O _)
s_.
n_ E r-
ii _IIIIE
_D.C
c-
•
(D
E
L
D
D 00
< o'r: 
0
C
C
E
(/)
m
E
L_
m
m l--
|m
O
O >
s. O
n_s.
O-"
e-
n-
L_
g5
Event 142 Along-Track Wind Profile and Shear Plot
Shown in the next graph and plot are the along-track
component of inertial winds experienced by the aircraft
during penetration of event 142 and the corresponding TDWR
shear map plot.
Superimposed on the inertial wind graph is the wind output of
the Oseguera-Bowles analytical wind model. The inputs to the
model are the dU and AR values provided by the TDWR for this
shear. Although the in situ winds were somewhat less than
predicted by the TDWR, the profile in the microburst core
matches the shape of the predicted profile. Event 142 is the
third data point from the left in the "TDWR Based F and
In Situ F" plot shown earlier, and produced excellent
agreement between predicted and actual F-factor when
corrected for altitude.
The shear (meters/second per kilometer) of event 142 and
airplane flight track are shown in the plot. This plot was
generated from TDWR velocity data and provided to NASA by MIT
Lincoln Laboratory. The shear plot agrees with aircraft
in situ data in showing the region of strong shear in the
center of the microburst icon.
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Event 143 Along-Track Wind Profile and Shear Plot
The inertial winds experienced by the aircraft in event 143
are shown followed by the corresponding TDWR shear map plot.
This is the same microburst as in event 142 but penetrated
about four minutes later while traveling on a reciprocal
track.
The event has expanded and a new outflow surge has developed.
Event 143 is the rightmost data point in the "TDWR Based F
and In Situ F" plot shown earlier. The inputs to the model
winds in this case are the TDWR reported AU (corrected by the
altitude shaping function) and AR. Since the TDWR-reported
winds significantly overestimated the winds encountered, the
altitude-corrected AU is shown in order to more closely match
the inertial wind peaks and compare the wind profiles. This
plot shows a significantly greater than predicted shear in
the first half of the icon penetration. This intermediate
peak in the wind profile is responsible for the altitude
corrected TDWR F-factor underestimate.
The shear in event 143 and airplane flight track are shown in
the plot. The shear plot agrees with aircraft in situ data
in showing the region of strong shear in the southern portion
of the microburst icon. The flight data correlates very well
with the shear plots and suggests that the TDWR is capable of
accurately locating shear and measuring shear magnitude.
Detailed data about microburst shear is available in the TDWR
system but not made available in the current alerting
strategy and data link system tested. Provision of this type
of data to end users could better quantify the hazard and
eliminate the need to estimate shear from wind measurements
in airborne applications.
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Discrete Alerting Performance
To evaluate the overall alerting performance of the TDWR data
link system as tested, all 19 microburst icon penetrations
were considered. Out of these 19 events, 18 produced
airborne TDWR alerts while only 2 produced in situ alerts.
By far the predominant factor producing this nuisance alert
rate is the spatial effect of not penetrating the microburst
core in most of the events. The F-factor estimation is not
valid for any arbitrary path in the vicinity of the
microburst. Although a separate F-factor was computed for
each icon, the division of one microburst into multiple icons
was such that any given icon did not necessarily contain the
core of a microburst downflow. Penetration of these icons
resulted in a significantly lower in situ F-factor than
predicted. The second factor affecting alerting performance
was the altitude effect described earlier. When adjusted for
altitude, fewer icons exceed the alert threshold.
The final factor affecting alerting performance was temporal.
A microburst can grow or decay in the one minute interval
between updates. In the penetration of event 142 the
airborne TDWR alert was received after the airplane entered
the microburst event and a new data link update was received.
Since this event did not exceed the in situ alert threshold
the TDWR alert was counted as a nuisance alert rather than a
late or missed alert. Although nuisance alerts caused by
decaying events are probably inevitable with any remote or
forward look sensor, the issue arises as to the possibility
that an alert will be missed on a significant event. This
type of missed alert requires that the F-factor increase from
below threshold to a truly hazardous level between TDWR
updates, and that the airplane enter the event between those
updates. Insufficient data was gathered during the flight
tests to estimate the frequency of this occurrence, although
the potential for this situation was demonstrated in an
aborted microburst approach when the TDWR F-factor estimate
increased from 0.18 to 0.26 between updates.
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P]ans for 1992 Research Flights
Numerous changes are being made to the TDWR processing and
the flight operation to enhance system performance and data
opportunities during the planned 1992 wind shear flight
tests. The altitude correction technique developed during
this data analysis will be implemented onboard the aircraft
for real-time application. Appropriate limits will be set in
the altitude correction so that the algorithm functions
realistically while on the ground or when the airplane is
loitering at a higher altitude than would be used for
penetration. On the ground the algorithm will calculate an
F-factor applicable to an initial climb speed and altitude.
At high altitude the F-factor will be applicable to the
altitude range used for penetrations. The alert criteria
will also be modified to prevent alerts during ground taxi
due to microbursts near the airport as well as when airborne
above 1500 feet. In 1991 numerous alerts were received while
the aircraft was on the ground and microbursts were ahead
(none of these alerts are included in the analysis.) In 1992
these alerts will not be given unless the airspeed is at
least 60 knots, indicating that takeoff roll is in progress.
Of course the microburst icons will always be displayed.
To increase the number of microburst core penetrations, the
aircraft coordinator at the TDWR site will be provided with a
real-time range/azimuth display of shear. This display,
along with the waypoint feature of the data link, will be
used to communicate the most promising locations to the
airborne crew. At the suggestion of Dr. Steve Campbell of
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a "waypoint-with-shear" data link
product will be tested. The concept is to make a direct
one-kilometer shear estimate at the TDWR site of a region
about the designated waypoint, and transmit this shear value
to the aircraft for use in F-factor estimation. This will
eliminate the process of estimating shear from the peaks of
the wind outflow for events marked with such a waypoint. The
normal F-factor processing of the microburst icons will
continue to be performed for all events.
Finally, the demonstration of an "automated pilot report"
capability on the data link is planned. In numerous events
(ref. 2) pilots have encountered wind shear and not provided
timely pilot reports to ATC. The controllers and subsequent
aircraft may not have the benefit of knowing why the earlier
aircraft missed the approach. The automated pilot report
will downlink the status of wind shear alerts from onboard
systems. In the NASA flight tests this alert information
will terminate at the TDWR site and will not actually be
provided to ATC.
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Summary
This experiment demonstrated the feasibility of transmitting
ground-based wind shear information to an aircraft via data
llnk, processing that information on the aircraft to estimate
the wind shear hazard index (F-factor), then providing the
information on a moving map display for operational use. In
the limited number of microburst core penetrations
experienced, the estimated F-factor compared very favorably
to the actual in situ F-factor. More cases are needed to
show statistical significance.
As the current system was implemented, the executive level
alerting performance was inadequate due to an excessive
number of nuisance alerts. These nuisance alerts were due to
inadequate data being available to the alerting process to
precisely locate the region of strong shear, and the aircraft
trajectory not intersecting those regions. The information
required to minimize this limitation is resident within the
TDWR system but not planned as an output product of
production TDWR systems. More complete use of the ground
system capabilities may greatly improve the utility of the
TDWR microburst information to the end users.
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Air/Ground Wind Shear Information Integration - Flight Test Results
Questions and Answers
Q: Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consultants) - The shape of these icons sort of bothers me a
little bit. I was wondering if the racetrack pattern has it's long axis along the radius vector from
the Doppler. Is that correct?
A: Dave Hinton (NASA Langley) - In these cases it did.
Q: Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consultants) - So that is a limitation of the single site ground
determination of the velocity field. If you were making an approach to a runway that was at right
angles to that, you are not going to get a lot of information. What have you concluded about
TDWR siting relative to the runway? How do you use this information to help you site the
TDWR now that they are being deployed'?
A: Dave Hinton (NASA Langley) - We did not try in our analysis to do that.. Our ground rules
were not to change the TDWR system, so we did not look into siting issues per say. There are
some very good historical reasons lor why those shapes are the way they are, and I'!1 let Steve
Cambell cover that.
A: Steve Cambell (MIT Lincoln Laboratory) - That is a good point Norm, Basically, what we
originally started out with was a big region that we identified as a microburst. Then we decided
to do a better job of isolating where the strong velocity change was by dividing this shape up in
the azimuthal direction. I will talk a little bit about this on Thursday, and about some of the ideas
we have for doing a better job of localizing the region of peak shear. But you make a very good
point, and that is one of the things we are currently lot)king at; how we can improve that shape
representation.
Q: Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consultants) - What about the question of TDWR siting, and
some practical situations?
A: Steve Cambeli (MIT Lincoln Laboratory) - That is another issue too. We have done
extensive testing where we use dual Doppler Radars to determine the shear for approach or
departure paths and we have been able to show that we can do a pretty good job of estimating the
shear or the change in velocity along the flight path with :t single TDWR. The deployed TDWR's
will be deployed in conjunction with the enhanced LLWAS system, which is a surface base
anemometer system. If you have a situation with a highly asymmetric microburst then the
LLWAS system should be able to detect it. Now we have also studied this issue of how likely is
it that the outflow would be highly asymmetric. Generally, in the South East they are not very
asymmetric. You do see asymmetric ones in places like Denver though; so in that case we think
that the surface sensor would be a fail safe tot" making sure we detect the strong shear of any
region perpendicular to the radar beam.
Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consullanls) - Well tfl" course the IA_WAS alarm at Dallas was after
the fact.
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Steve Cambell (MIT Lincoln Laboratory) - 1 should point out that we are integrating with the
enhanced LLWAS system. The current six station LLWAS is not really adequate for microburst
detection. The enhanced LLWAS system have something like a 13 to 16 stations. It's a much
more extensive LLWAS network which covers most of the approach and departure paths. It also
has a different algorithm than that used in the current Phase I LLWAS. We have been able to
show that when you integrate TDWR and the enhance LLWAS there is a very high probability of
detecting a hazardous wind shear along any arbitrary path. So we are very confident. Both
systems work very well and when you combine the two you have an extremely reliable system.
We have been able to verify that against our dual Doppler measurements, and other
mcasaremcn_.
Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consultants) - Dual Doppler is handy, but you won't have it at those
forty-six sites.
Steve Cambeli (MIT Lincoln Laboratory) - The dual Doppler is for the purpose of generating
the truth so we know what actually happened. We are validating our single Doppler with the
surface sensors against dual Doppler.
Q: Sam Shirck (Continental Airlines)- With respect to the TDWR results, is it possible that in
the future airborne radar systems may data link their view of the wind shear situations to the
ground based TDWR, since the airborne systems have a better viewing angle and a much
enhanced update rate?
A: Dave Hinton (NASA Langley) - I think it certainly would be possible to down link the data
to the ground base system. The primary obstacle standing in the way is going to be the lack of a
system driver for doing that. Within the context of the program we are doing, we have a charter
not to change the ground system. Now, if there is a system requirement to do that, it could
possibly be done. There are a couple of technical issues involved; one is the data rate that would
be required to get that amount of information down, and secondly a lot of dual and triple Doppler
analysis' have been done of numerous events and that can take, I would expect, a significant
amount of post processing. To do the triple Doppler analysis in real time would probably be a
very large computational effort. So it is a question of a system driver plus the effort involved to
do it.
Jim Evans (MIT) - Where the ground systems are going in the relatively near future is toward
what is called integrated terminal weather systems, which in fact tries to integrate information
from all the available ground and airborne systems. We are already talking about ingesting winds
and temperature data out of planes. I don't think it is a big issue to transmit that information
down over a Mode S data link. I think what you would do is that you would formulate it as a
message, it would then come up as an additional piece of alert information that could be passed
along in much the same style and thereby provided automatically to succeeding planes. I do not
think you would have to get into dual or triple Doppler analysis.
Dave Hinton (NASA Langley) - Obviously, you could operate such a system at various levels,
triple Doppler being the most complex. Another way would be to simply look at alert regions and
use those in some manner. Which Jim, if I understand, is what you are referring to.
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Jim Evans (MIT) - I think I would try that for starters, because 1 think the others would be fairly
complicated. One of the issues that you would get into immediately on dual or triple Doppler,
with an alrtxmae weather radar at X-band, would be the whole question about how well you had
unfolded your velocities. You don't have to unfold absolutely to get shear regions, but you could
be off by a whole fold without any trouble at all.
Q: Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consultants) - I would like to revisit the question of TDWR
siting. I don't know to whom I should address the question, but if you have an airport like O'Hare
with intersecting runways, where do you put the terminal Doppler radar?
A: Jim Evans (MIT) - It is fairly simple. What we have used as the criteria in siting the TDWR
is to look at the runway usage during circumstances when there is weather, and try to line up the
TDWR to look along those runways. We then do an adjustment in cases where there are split
runway regions. O'Hare is certainly the ugliest case one can point to. In most of the others, it is a
fairly reasonable site. We have tried to consider looking up the runways the maximum amount of
the time consistent with when the weather was going to be present. It is a lively task of course, in
a place like Leguardia, just trying to find a place to put the radar. I think we have been very
successful.
Q: Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consultants) - If you have intersecting runways and low
weather, and conditions conducive to microbursts, is there any intent to restrict the operations to
the runway that is favored by the terminal Doppler weather radar?
A: Jim Evans (MIT) - Again, we don't see the need to do that. What we have been trying to do
is assess the performance by taking dual Doppler measurements of the winds along the runway.
There is certainly ample reason to believe that dual Doppler does a very good job of estimating
the winds. What we do is we look at the winds along the runways no matter what there
orientation is, whether the TDWR has a good look angle or a bad look angle, and assess the
accuracy of the warnings. For example, if the actual wind along the center line of the path had
more than a 30 knot wind change over a suitably small distance we would check to see if we are
issuing an alert or not. It is a very high probability that we do, no matter what the orientation of
the runway is. That is what we have seen for Denver, Kansas City, and Orlando. In that process
we use runways that we have lousy look angles to. The reason that we know what the winds are
is because we have dual and in some cases triple Doppler data to tell us what the winds are. That
is the way we are trying to assess it. Are we giving it a timely warning for that runway? Sure, it
is a little better on the ones that you have a nicer look angle, but it doesn't mean that you are not
detecting, very reliably, all the ones at any angle you want to imagine a runway to be.
Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consultants)- Someone keeps bringing up in this discussion, dual
Doppler. My understanding is that there is only one TDWR per airport.
Jim Evans (MIT) - Let me again make it clear what is being done. From a research basis, we go
to airports with two and three radars and we ewduate quantitatively our performance. We score a
single radar's ability to give accurate warnings on all the runways. You say, how did you know
what was there. The reason we know what was there is that we had dual or triple Doppler. Now
when we go out in the actual operational system there is only one radar at the airport. But, we
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believe we know what its performance is going to be. This summer will be our seventh year of
testing with dual Doppler data. We think by doing this testing over a wide variety of airports and
geographic regions and having synthetic runways as well as real runways, we have a very good
handle on the performance of the system. That is the rule. It isn't that a operational system has
dual or triple Doppler, it is that we have done careful experiments with dual and triple Doppler
and supporting mesonet systems. Is there a microburst the radar can't measure. We have gone
out and tried to address that number in this phase. That is what we are quoting from and we hope
the past is a prediction of the future. Of course, the wodd may change. This is one of the most
carefully tested systems that I know of.
Q: Norm Crabill (Aero Space Consultants) - Yes, I agree there has been a lot of testing.
What has been the result for Chicago where will the radar be located?
A: Jim Evans (MIT) - We have not done dual Doppler testing yet at O'Hare. The radar will be
almost due south of O'Hare. There is an ARSR site down there it is roughly to the east of
Midway. It is a location that will give a good look at both Midway and O'Hare.
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